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Introduction
USING THE WORDS SEX, gender, sexual orientation, and gender
identity interchangeably may seem innocuous, but the disaggregation
and conflation of these different categories has permitted courts to
either extend or give a more preclusive effect to sex discrimination
under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 In fact, a closer
examination of these decisions suggests that courts were acting pur-
posively by applying different categories for certain types of cases and
individuals as a way to prohibit recovery for plaintiffs of a particular
sexual orientation or gender identity.
Although sex is often the term used in federal civil rights stat-
utes,2 such as in Title VII, society’s understanding of gender and sexu-
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and encouragement.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
2. Civil rights statutes do not treat issues of sex discrimination differently than Title
VII. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006) (“No employer having em-
ployees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment
in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex . . . .”); Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604(a) (2000) (“[I]t shall be unlaw-
ful . . . [t]o refuse to sell or rent . . . or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of . . . or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or na-
tional origin.”); Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006)
1
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ality is much different now than it was when many such laws were
passed. Sex is now understood as merely the biological underpinnings
of an individual,3 while gender is the societal expectation of what it
means to be male or female.4 Because gender refers to the physical
appearance and mannerisms of an individual, many scholars agree
that this should be the focal point of inquiry in cases involving “sex.”5
One scholar astutely captures this idea with her phrase “sex bears an
epiphenomenal relationship to gender.”6
This Article examines the efficacy of the most recently proposed
version of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”) in pro-
tecting plaintiffs on the basis of gender nonconformity. A comparative
(“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
3. The term “sex” refers to the designation of men and women into categories based
on “differences in the structure and function of the reproductive organs . . . .” 15 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 107 (2d ed. 1989). This definition is not inconsistent with the
definition courts have applied when defining “sex” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) (pre-
cluding recovery for a transsexual plaintiff “[i]n light of the traditional binary conception
of sex”); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (adopting a plain
meaning of sex which leads to the narrow conclusion that discrimination based on sex
makes it “unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and against
men because they are men”). Title VII does not provide a definition as explicit as the
Oxford English Dictionary but is rooted in biology: “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the
basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to . . . pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
4. In this Article, “gender” refers to the designation of male and female into catego-
ries based on “social and cultural, as opposed to the biological, distinctions between the
sexes.” 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 428 (2d ed. 1989); see also JUDITH BUTLER, GEN-
DER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 10 (1990) (stating gender is so-
cially constructed and often defined “relative to the constructed relations in which it is
determined”). The Supreme Court expanded Title VII to consider “sex” as more expan-
sive, but acknowledging sex stereotypes goes beyond the traditional understanding of
“sex.” See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (holding that Congress’s
intent of Title VII was “to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employ-
ment decisions”).
5. See, e.g., Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disag-
gregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995). According to Franke, anti-discrimi-
nation laws inappropriately focus on an individual’s biology and not his or her gender—
the physical manifestation and presentation of one’s masculinity and femininity. Id. at 2.
Courts’ defererence to biology in such cases makes it a false proxy for gender identity and
sexual identification. Id. at 40. But see Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1,
76 (1995) (expressing reluctance in protecting gender under anti-discrimination laws in
part because its inclusion may produce gender essentialism of masculinity and femininity).
6. Franke, supra note 5, at 2. R
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analysis of discrimination based on perceived sexual orientation7 and
gender identity8 reveals that plaintiffs are generally victims of discrimi-
nation because of physical appearance and gender-nonconforming at-
tributes. Part I briefly reviews the legislative history of Title VII and
ENDA and those laws’ application of sex, gender, and sexual orienta-
tion. Part II analyzes case law involving gender nonconformity dis-
crimination under Title VII. This Part illustrates that gay, lesbian, and
transgender plaintiffs are victims of discrimination and tend to be
targeted not because of their sexual orientation and gender identity
per se, but rather because they are gender nonconformists who exude
visible traits and mannerisms that are atypical with their ascribed bio-
logical sex. This Part will demonstrate that the most recent version of
ENDA would successfully prevent judges from engaging in the inap-
propriate conflation of sexual orientation and gender stereotyping.
Given the previous failed efforts to include gender identity within the
purview of ENDA, Part III highlights the legal implications of elimi-
nating the gender identity language from ENDA. Without gender
identity protections, employers could actually use sexual stereotypes as
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason to discriminate against an em-
ployee. Consequently, further policy efforts should be placed to keep
7. For this Article, “sexual orientation” refers to “[t]he direction of one’s sexual in-
terest toward members of the same, opposite, or both sexes.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1596 (4th ed. 2000).
8. There are many ways to define “gender identity.” See PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON
MINTER, THE POLICY INSTITUTE OF THE NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NATIONAL
CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICY-
MAKERS 45–50 (2000). Currah and Minter cite various state and local laws as examples of
statutory definitions of gender identity. One example is a definition adopted by the Coun-
cil of the City of New Orleans:
[T]he actual or perceived condition, status or acts of:
Identifying emotionally or psychologically with the sex other than one’s bio-
logical or legal sex at birth, whether or not there has been a physical change of
the organs of sex.
Presenting and/or holding oneself out to the public as a member of the
biological sex that was not one’s biological or legal sex at birth.
Lawfully displaying physical characteristics and/or behavioral characteristics
and/or expressions which are widely perceived as being appropriate to the bio-
logical or legal sex other than one’s biological sex at birth, as when a male is
perceived as feminine or a female is perceived as masculine, and/or being physi-
cally and/or behaviorally androgynous.
Id. at 46 (citing NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE § 54-379 (1998)). This quote highlights the criti-
cal feature of this definition, namely an individual’s personal identification of being male
or female. Gender nonconformists merely refer to those who exhibit mannerisms, physical
attributes, and appearances that do not conform to societal norms of their assigned sex.
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gender identity within the scope of ENDA.9 But, more importantly,
the debate over a gender-inclusive ENDA should reinvigorate a discus-
sion about the role of sex, gender, and sexual orientation.
I. History of Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation in Federal
Employment Law
In order to understand the history of ENDA, it is imperative to
investigate the legislative history of “sex” under Title VII. The paucity
of discussion on the legislative floor about sex did not provide judges
and law makers with enough of a record to rely upon for purposes of
interpreting the meaning of sex and whether it should be expanded
to cover gender bias and transgender10 discrimination. This Part de-
tails the history11 of Title VII, focusing specifically on the inclusion of
sex within the amendment.
9. Scholars have presented a variety of stances regarding a transgender-inclusive
ENDA. See, e.g., Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of Trans-
gender Formal Equality, 23 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 144 (2008) (stating that a trans-
gender-inclusive ENDA would provide legal protections but would not challenge the
fundamental problem of relying on rigid categories such as sex and gender); J. Banning
Jasiunas, Note, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a “Separate but Equal” Federal Statute Adequately Protect
Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination?, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1529, 1554–56 (2000)
(claiming that creating free-standing legislation could lead courts to interpret the law
more narrowly than Title VII, and to refuse to create the more “interpretative” frameworks
developed through case law, such as sex stereotyping).
Instead of enacting ENDA to obtain gender identity protections, another stance on
the issue is to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender, which
would be an umbrella term for sexual orientation and gender identity. See Jennifer S. Hen-
dricks, Instead of ENDA, A Course Correction for Title VII, 103 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 209,
210 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/43/. However,
the proposal to amend Title VII, while procedurally plausible, has historically been unsuc-
cessful. For a detailed history of Title VII amendment efforts, see infra Part I.C.
10. In this Article, the term “transgender” is used as an umbrella term to refer to
individuals “whose gender identity or expression does not conform to the social expecta-
tions for their assigned sex at birth.” TRANSGENDER RIGHTS xiv (Paisley Currah et al. eds.,
2006). There is a distinction, however, between transgender and transsexual; while trans-
gender refers to a broader gender identity, “transsexual” is a medical or psychiatric diagno-
sis. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 532–38 (4th ed. 1994).
11. Title VII was not the first time law makers sought employment discrimination pro-
tections. The earliest account of employment discrimination legislation was the Unemploy-
ment Relief Act of 1933, which provided that, “no discrimination shall be made on account
of race, color, or creed.” Unemployment Relief Act, ch. 17, § 1, 48 Stat. 22, 23 (1933)
(repealed 1966). See Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a
Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 169 (1991). In 1941, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 (commonly known as the Fair Employment Act),
which affirmed the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, or
national origin in the national defense industry. DVORA YANOW, CONSTRUCTING “RACE” AND
“ETHNICITY” IN AMERICA 96 (2003). This history inspired law makers to introduce other bills
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A. Title VII and the Real Reason for Including Sex
In June 1963, when Title VII was first introduced on the House
floor, the bill only included employment protections on the basis of
race, color, and national origin.12 The legislative history of Title VII
suggests that sex was used as a political maneuver to defeat the law’s
passage. Most notably, Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia,
who had a well-known history of opposing civil rights legislation,13 re-
sorted to more implicit means to oppose the current bill given the
political climate. He proposed a one word amendment to Title VII—
“sex”—in the hopes that it would be defeated.14
Following Representative Smith’s proposal, the debate concern-
ing the amendment was light-hearted and humorous.15 One historian
that provided employment discrimination protections in private employment. See Francis J.
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUSTRY & COM. L. REV. 431, 433 (1966).
12. This was an omnibus civil rights bill introduced by President John F. Kennedy.
The bill was intended to affirm the rights provided to African Americans, such as voting
and public education, while prohibiting discrimination in federal programs, public accom-
modation, and employment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. 1731, 88th Cong. (1963); see also
KATHLEEN MORGAN BARRY, FEMININITY IN FLIGHT 128 (2007) (noting the exclusion of “sex”
in the bill).
13. See BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, KEEPER OF THE RULES: CONGRESSMAN HOWARD W. SMITH
OF VIRGINIA 194–95 (1987). Representative  Smith’s biography contains numerous inter-
views with his congressional colleagues who noted his opposition both to race integration
and gender equality. Additionally, Representative Smith was from a state in which textile
mills wanted to engage in pay inequity to reduce the costs of production. A sex-inclusive
Civil Rights Act would enable women to choose where they wanted to work and demand
pay equity; choices that would hurt the profitability of southern companies. “As a result,
Smith and other southern Democrats may have adopted a chivalrous pose to assist local
businesses.” Id. at 195.
14. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964), reprinted in 1964 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII
AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3213 (1964).
15. See id. at 3213–28. After offering the amendment, Representative Smith pro-
ceeded to read a letter from a woman who pointed out that although the 1960 U.S. Census
found that women outnumber men in America, women were considered the minority. The
letter read: “Just why the Creator would set up such an imbalance of spinsters, shutting off
the ‘right’ of every female to have a husband of her own, is, of course, known only to
nature.” Id. at 3213. Represenative Emanuel Celler, a New York Democrat and the then
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, quickly responded by challenging Represen-
tative Smith’s view that women are minorities, claiming, “I heard with a great deal of inter-
est . . . that women are in the minority. . . . I can say as a result of 49 years of experience . . .
that women, [i]ndeed, are not in the minority in my house. . . . I usually have the last two
words, and those words are, ‘Yes, dear.’” Id. at 3214. Representative Celler then suggested
that any such inequality was appropriate, stating, “[y]ou know, the French have a phrase
for it when they speak of women and men . . . ‘vive la difference.’ I think the French are
right.” Id. at 3215.
Although the women supported Representative Smith’s “sex” amendment, they were
just as light-hearted in the debate. For example, Representative Katherine St. George, a
Republican from New York, admitted that women are not the minority and are in fact
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described this discussion as the “Ladies Day in the House.”16 On Feb-
ruary 8, 1964, the same day as the addition of sex to Title VII, the Civil
Rights Act passed in the House with a vote of 168 to 133.17 The bill
ultimately passed in the Senate with a vote of 73 to 27.18
What began as an insidious plot to defeat the civil rights bill has
become a nightmare for judicial interpretation, particularly in more
contemporary cases involving gender stereotypes.19 The lack of a de-
tailed legislative history of Title VII has prompted courts to employ a
plain meaning interpretation of sex by deferring to a biological defini-
tion.20 To compound matters, our understanding of gender and sexu-
ality has since evolved,21 and yet Title VII jurisprudence remains
grounded in a more antiquated conception.
B. Sexual Stereotypes and the Recognition of Gender Under Title
VII
Nearly thirty-five years after the enactment of Title VII, the
United States Supreme Court expanded the definition of sex discrimi-
nation to include gender bias within the theory of sex stereotyping.22
The Court expanded the interpretation of Title VII protections to in-
clude discrimination against someone on the basis of a sexual stereo-
type. Sex stereotype23 departs from the strict, biological definition of
privileged. “We outlast you—we outlive you—we nag you to death . . . [but] we are entitled
to this little crumb of equality.” Id. at 3221. For a more detailed discussion of the congres-
sional debates concerning the addition of sex to Title VII, see CHARLES W. WHALEN &
BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT 115–21 (1985).
16. See Freeman, supra note 11, at 163. R
17. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964), reprinted in 1964 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII
AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3228 (1964).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. The earliest accounts in which scholars understood “sex” and “gender” to be dis-
tinct categories was in the mid- to late-1970s. See Rhoda K. Unger, Toward a Redefinition of
Sex and Gender, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1085, 1086 (1979); GAYLE RUBIN, The Traffic of Women:
Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157, 159
(Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975). These distinctions were accepted by feminist scholars in the
community by the 1990s. See, e.g., SUSAN A. SPEER, GENDER TALK: FEMINISM, DISCOURSE AND
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS 60–62 (2005) (arguing that, by the 1990s, notable scholars such as
Judith Butler embraced and wrote extensively on the sex/gender distinction).
22. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
23. Sex stereotype is defined as societal expectations of physical appearance, de-
meanor, and skills that are associated with one sex or the other. In the context of the
workplace, these stereotypes influence individuals’ perceptions on how male and female
employees should behave: men should be assertive, while women should be compassion-
ate. IRENE PADAVIC & BARBARA RESKIN, WOMEN AND MEN AT WORK 42 (2d ed. 2002).
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sex under the law. In cases recognizing discrimination based on sex
stereotyping, a plaintiff could demonstrate discrimination by estab-
lishing that the employer’s challenged action was triggered by the
plaintiff’s failure to conform to her employer’s sex-stereotyped
expectations.
The seminal case and the most notable legal illustration of gen-
der stereotyping is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.24 In that case, Ann Hop-
kins worked as a senior manager at Price Waterhouse when she
became a candidate for partnership. As part of the partnership selec-
tion process, the firm solicited written comments from all the current
partners on the candidates. Many endorsed Hopkins, noting her pro-
fessional accomplishments. However, several other partners did not
support her promotion. The critical comments were largely based on
her personality and physical appearance. Some of the comments
called Hopkins “macho,” while others noted that she “overcompen-
sated for being a woman” and that she needed to take “a course at a
charm school.”25 Hopkins was ultimately denied partnership, and
when Hopkins’ supervisor told her that she would be reconsidered for
candidacy the following year, he suggested that she “walk more femi-
ninely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”26
When the partners subsequently refused to consider her candi-
dacy the following year, Hopkins filed suit and alleged that Price
Waterhouse’s handling of her partnership candidacy amounted to sex
discrimination. The district court judge ruled in her favor because the
partnership selection process was tainted by the firm’s reliance on sex
stereotyping.27 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held the district court’s ruling that reliance on sex stereotyping could
and, in this case, did constitute sex-based discrimination.28 The matter
was appealed to the United States Supreme Court by Price
Waterhouse.
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the district court’s ruling.
The Court held that, “[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gen-
24. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
25. Id. at 235.
26. Id.
27. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (D.D.C. 1985).
28. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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der.”29 The Court noted, “we are beyond the day when an employer
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group.”30 It is important to note
that the Court did not hold that recognizing the existence of sex stere-
otyping does not create a presumption of discrimination. Rather, the
Court stated:
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably
prove that gender played a part in a particular employment deci-
sion. The plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on
her gender in making its decision. In making this showing, stereo-
typed remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part.31
Price Waterhouse served as a significant departure in sex discrimi-
nation jurisprudence because the Court acknowledged that sex dis-
crimination can manifest if an employee is gender nonconforming
and does not satisfy the expectations of masculinity and femininity. A
sex stereotype theory provides a better point of reference in cases in-
volving a broader range of individuals who are not victims of sex dis-
crimination per se.
C. Legislative History of ENDA
The fight for sexual orientation employment protection has been
a contested one for many decades. The earliest effort occurred in
1974 when New York Representatives Bella Abzug and Edward Koch
introduced the Equality Act of 1974.32 The bill proposed to add sexual
orientation and marital status protections to the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The bill was referred and failed to make it out of the House
Committee on Civil Rights, a division within the Committee on the
Judiciary.
In 1975, several Congressmen33 joined Representative Abzug in
her efforts to include sexual orientation as a protected class under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Representative Abzug once again introduced
29. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
30. Id. at 251.
31. Id.
32. H.R. 14752, 93d Cong. (1974).
33. Representative Donald M. Fraser of Minnesota introduced a bill to prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual preference in public accommodations, public facilities,
public education, federally assisted programs, employment, and housing. The bill failed to
make it out of the Judiciary Committee. H.R. 2667, 94th Cong. (1975).
Representative Richard L. Ottinger of New York introduced a bill to prohibit discrimi-
nation on the basis of affectional or sexual preference in public accommodations, public
education, equal employment opportunities, housing (the sale, rental, and financing), and
education programs which receive Federal aid. The bill failed to make it out of the Judici-
ary Committee. H.R. 10389, 94th Cong. (1975).
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three pieces of legislation to ban discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference.34 Once again, all legislation failed to make it out of the
Judiciary Committee for a House vote.
After additional legislative efforts to amend Title VII failed,35 ad-
vocates switched tactics by introducing the stand-alone Employment
Non-Discrimination Act in 1994.36 The bill’s sponsor, Representative
Gerry Studds of Massachusetts, drafted the bill to only protect individ-
uals on the basis of sexual orientation and not on the basis of trans-
gender or gender identity. The bill was referred to the House
Subcommittee on Select Education and Civil Rights. Like prior legisla-
tion, the bill failed to make it out of the Subcommittee for a vote.
Representative Studds reintroduced the bill in 1995 but again was
unsuccessful.37
In September 1996, the Senate rejected a gender identity exclu-
sive ENDA by one vote: 49 to 50.38 Although this defeat marked a
Representative Phillip Burton of California introduced a bill to prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual preference in public accommodations, public facilities, public
education, federally assisted opportunities, equal employment opportunities, housing, and
educational programs receiving Federal assistance. The bill failed to make it out of the
Judiciary Committee. H.R. 13019, H.R. 94th Cong. (1976).
34. H.R. 13928, 94th Cong. (1976); H.R. 5452, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 166, 94th
Cong. (1975).
35. The House led the attack in attempting to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
H.R. 431, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 423, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 1429, 102d Cong. (1991);
H.R. 655, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 709, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 230, 99th Cong. (1985);
H.R. 2624, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 427, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 3371, 97th Cong. (1981);
H.R. 1454, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 2074, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 12149, 95th Cong.
(1978); H.R. 10575, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 8269, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 8268, 95th
Cong. (1977); H.R. 7775, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 5239, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 4794,
95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 2998, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 451, 95th Cong. (1977).
The Senate’s efforts were not as numerous and began several years after the House’s
first bill in 1974. In 1979, the first Senate bill prohibiting employment discrimination on
the basis sexual orientation was introduced by Senator Paul E. Tsongas of Massachusetts. S.
2081, 96th Cong. (1979). This effort resulted in additional efforts by the Senate, all of
which failed. S. 573, 102d Cong. (1991); S. 47, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 2109, 100th Cong.
(1988); S. 464, 100th Cong. (1987); S. 1432, 99th Cong. (1985).
36. S. 2238, 103d Cong. (1994). It was this ENDA bill that also marked an acknowl-
edgement of perceived sexual orientation. The bill defined sexual orientation to include
“lesbian, gay, bisexual, or heterosexual orientation, real or perceived, as manifested by
identity, acts, statements, or associations.” Id. at § 18(12). Perceived sexual orientation dis-
crimination was ultimately incorporated in all subsequent ENDA bills.
37. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995).
38. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996). The
bill would have passed but for an unexpected turn of events for Arkansas Senator David
Pryor. He intended to vote for ENDA but had to remain in Arkansas on the day of the vote
because his son was undergoing emergency cancer surgery. See Carolyn Lochhead, Senate
OKs Gay Marriage Restrictions, Job Discrimination Bill Fails By One Vote, S. F. CHRON., Sept. 11,
1996, at A1.
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history of non-support39 by Congress, this near victory may have been
the result of unseen political maneuvers in the Senate. ENDA’s spon-
sor, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, struck a deal with
Republican Senators to permit the bill to come up for a vote in ex-
change for Democrat Senators agreeing to end a filibuster blocking a
vote on the anti-gay Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”),40 which
would limit marriage under federal law to a union only between a
man and a woman. On the same day ENDA was narrowly defeated,
DOMA passed with a vote of 85 to 14.41
Since 1996, Congress has introduced ENDA legislation on four
additional occasions,42 with the hope that popular support43 would
eventually lead to its passage. In 2007, after a decade-long effort to
pass ENDA, Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts introduced
a new version of ENDA that prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, actual or perceived, and gender identity.44 The
proposed bill would have required employers to provide adequate
shower or dressing facilities to employees who are transitioning.45 The
Act did not prohibit employers from imposing reasonable dress or
39. The non-support reference not only refers to the numerous attempts to pass em-
ployment protections for gays and lesbians, but also to the fact that any such legislation
had never been successfully brought to the floor of either the House or Senate. In fact,
there was only one hearing conducted in 1993 because Senator Edward M. Kennedy of
Massachusetts permitted one hearing before the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee. See Nicol C. Rae, A Right Too Far? The Congressional Politics of DOMA and ENDA,
in CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF EMERGING RIGHTS 65, 75 (Colton C. Campbell & John F.
Stack, Jr. eds. 2001).
40. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
41. See Jill Lawrence, Anti-Gay Marriage Bill OK’d Senate Then Rejects Bid to Ban Job Bias,
U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 11, 1996, at A1.
42. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, H.R. 3285, 108th Cong. (2003);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2001, H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. (2001); Employ-
ment Non-Discrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999); Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 1997, S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997). None of these bills included trans-
gender or gender identity within the scope of protection.
43. Scholar Amin Ghaziani reported that popular support for ENDA was on the rise
during this time. He cites, for example, a 1995 and 1996 Newsweek poll that showed that
eighty-four percent of respondents supported workplace rights for gays and lesbians. Simi-
larly, a Princeton Survey Research Associates poll found that eighty-three percent of Ameri-
cans believed that gays and lesbians deserved equal employment rights. AMIN GHAZIANI,
THE DIVIDENDS OF DISSENT 205 (2008).
44. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007).
The bill defined “gender identity” as “the gender-related identity, appearance, or manner-
isms or other gender-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the
individual’s designated sex at birth.” Id. at § 3(a)(6).
45. Although the latest version of ENDA includes a provision concerning shower and
dressing facilities, this provision was included in H.R. 2015, but ultimately eliminated along
with other gender identity provisions. The relevant section reads:
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grooming standards but provided that employers allow transitioning
employees to adhere to their new gender’s dress or grooming
standards.
According to Representative Frank, a survey of House members
revealed that the bill would fail to garner enough support, but
that a bill solely banning discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion was likely to pass.46 As a result, Representative Frank introduced
a new bill protecting sexual orientation but not gender iden-
tity.47 After revising ENDA to omit gender identity,48 the House of
CERTAIN SHARED FACILITIES.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to es-
tablish an unlawful employment practice based on actual or perceived gender
identity due to the denial of access to shared shower or dressing facilities in which
being seen unclothed is unavoidable, provided that the employer provides rea-
sonable access to adequate facilities that are not inconsistent with the employee’s
gender identity as established with the employer at the time of employment or
upon notification to the employer that the employee has undergone or is under-
going gender transition, whichever is later.
H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. § 8(a)(3) (2009). Based on the hearings in 2007, one stated reason
for opposition to a gender identity inclusive ENDA was the alleged safety issues and poten-
tial damage to employee relations. Diane Gramley, President of the American Family Asso-
ciation of Pennsylvania, claimed, without statistical support, that small businesses would
suffer financial strain. She noted reluctance for a fully inclusive law and claimed “radical
transgender activists would demand to use shower facilities in the workplace.” The Employ-
ment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007 (H.R. 2015): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Em-
ployment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 74 (2007)
(statement of Diane Gramley, President, American Family Association of Pennsylvania).
A second concern was raised by Representative John Kline of Minnesota. He claimed
that ENDA would include “gender identity” as a protected class but the definition was
“vague and could result in significant uncertainty.” Id. at 6. Representative Kline, like
Gramley, believed that the requirements for shower and dressing facilities for transgender
or transitioning employees could raise privacy or financial concerns for employers. Id.
(statement of Representative John Kline Senior Republic Member, Subcomm. on Health,
Employment, Labor and Pensions).
46. 153 CONG. REC. H11383 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2007) (statement of Representative Bar-
ney Frank) (“[W]e have the votes to pass a bill today in the House that would ban discrimi-
nation in employment based on sexual orientation, but sadly, we don’t yet have it on
gender identity.”).
47. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007).
48. Id. The text of House Bill 3685 provided, inter alia:
SEC 4. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED
(a) Employer Practice: It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to the compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, because of such
individual’s actual or perceived sexual orientation; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for employ-
ment of the employer in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment or otherwise adversely affect the status of the indi-
vidual as an employee, because of such individual’s actual or perceived sexual
orientation.
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Representatives passed it on November 7, 2007, by a vote of 235 to
184.49
Although the ENDA was not taken up by the Senate after the
House vote, there has been a reenergized campaign in the legislative
and executive branches for a fully inclusive bill. On January 22, 2009,
President Barack Obama posted his 100-days agenda on the White
House website, proclaiming his support for a gender identity inclu-
sive-ENDA.50 Furthermore, congressional lawmakers reintroduced a
fully inclusive ENDA similar to the original legislation introduced in
2007.51 Despite this momentum, lawmakers acknowledge the political
hurdles in garnering support for such legislation. Representative
Frank is hopeful that a fully inclusive ENDA will pass, but in an inter-
view he said that “[e]fforts to include transgender people have failed
in New York, Massachusetts and Maryland. . . . It doesn’t get easier
when you throw in South Carolina and Utah.”52 Simply put, he said
“[t]here’s no certainty in politics.”53
Even though a stand-alone bill reinforces the idea that sexual ori-
entation and transgender discrimination are separate forms of dis-
crimination, the passage of ENDA would still mark a significant victory
for workplace equality. More importantly, passing ENDA with “per-
49. Final Votes for Roll Call 1057, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll1057.xml
(last visited June 18, 2009).
50. The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/civil_rights (last visited
Feb. 28, 2009). Additionally, President Obama’s previous legislative efforts, as an Illinois
State Senator, prove his willingness to support a fully inclusive ENDA. He sponsored legis-
lation in the Illinois State Senate to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity. Human Rights Amendment for Sexual Orienta-
tion, S.B. 2597, 93d Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2004). This amendment to the Illinois Human Rights
Act provided discrimination protections for persons on the basis of sexual orientation,
which was an umbrella term for “actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisex-
uality or gender-related identity, whether or not traditionally associated with the person’s
designated sex at birth.” Id. at § 1-103. This legislation prohibited discrimination in em-
ployment and housing.
51. The legislation was originally introduced on June 23, 2009, with Representative
Frank as the sponsor and ten others as co-sponsors. Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 2009, H.R. 2981, 111th Cong. (2009). However, the legislation was reintroduced on June
24, 2009, this time with 123 co-sponsors. H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009). In addition, on
August 5, 2009, the Senate introduced a fully inclusive ENDA with Senator Jeff Merkley as
the sponsor and thirty-nine others as co-sponsors. S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009).
52. Chris Johnson, Gay Rights Bills Remain Stalled in Congress, The Washington Blade,
May 29, 2009, http://www.washblade.com/2009/5-29/news/national/14609.cfm?page=2.
53. Id. Although Representative Frank’s concerns are justified, he was somewhat inac-
curate in the state support concerning gender identity protections; Massachusetts and the
District of Columbia both have laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender
identity. For a more detailed overview of gender identity employment protections, see infra
text accompanying note 54. R
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ceived sexual orientation” and “gender identity” would also mark a
shift in law making. That shift would be characterized by legislators
recognizing that gay, lesbian, and transgender employees are not nec-
essarily discriminated against because of actual sexual orientation per
se—or, in the words of ENDA, “actual sexual orientation”—or trans-
gender status but rather these individuals tend to deviate from societal
expectations of masculinity and femininity, and, as a consequence, are
presumed to be homosexual. Such discrimination is rooted in gender
stereotyping, which has been historically eschewed by judges.
II. The Efficacy of ENDA54 and the Application of Sex and
Gender by Federal Courts
A law that recognizes perceived sexual orientation discrimination
would allow gay and lesbian plaintiffs to successfully pursue claims
that are premised on gender nonconformity55 but would not ade-
quately protect transgender individuals. The following is a presenta-
tion of case law involving homosexual and transgender litigants who
proceeded under a Title VII sex stereotype theory of liability. These
cases show that courts have been unwilling to apply the Price
Waterhouse precedent when appropriate. In cases involving gay and les-
bian plaintiffs, courts conflate gender identity and sexual orientation
to preclude plaintiffs from succeeding in sex discrimination suits be-
cause these courts mistakenly believe that the plaintiffs are using Title
VII as a way to “bootstrap” a claim of sexual orientation onto a sex
54. The analysis in this Article pertains exclusively to federal cases invoking Title VII.
However, some state legislatures are treating sexual orientation and gender identity
differently for purposes of prohibiting discrimination on those bases in private
employment. Currently, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have statutes that
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in private employment. Further,
only twelve states and the District of Columbia have statutes that prohibit discrimination
on the basis of gender identity in private employment. For a more detailed discussion of
state employment discrimination protections, see Human Rights Campaign—Workplace
Laws, http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/workplace_laws.asp (last visited Aug. 26,
2009).
55. In this particular section, the term “gender nonconformity” is used to refer to
individuals who do not appear or act in accordance with societal gender norms. See supra
note 4. One obvious implication of a gender identity-exclusive ENDA is that it would pre- R
clude transgender plaintiffs from using this law; however, there are two reasons why the
conflation of sexual orientation and gender does not apply to such plaintiffs. First, courts
tend to adopt a more biological interpretation of sex when confronted with transgender
plaintiffs invoking Title VII protections. See infra text accompanying notes 89–91. Second,
there have been a few cases in which courts have extended sex stereotyping in transgender
cases. See infra notes 104–14. One explanation of these cases is the fact that transgender
does not denote homosexuality, thus reassuring judges that these individuals are not using
sex stereotyping to indirectly obtain relief for sexual orientation discrimination.
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stereotype theory. In cases involving transgender individuals, courts
have deferred to biology and the plain meaning of “sex” to deny re-
covery. In these cases, transgender plaintiffs are discriminated against
by virtue of their physical appearances and mannerisms and not nec-
essarily because of sex or sexual orientation, per se. An overview of
these cases, in light of ENDA, demonstrates how the notion of gender
nonconformity would be inconsistently applied if the law permitted
recovery on the basis of perceived sexual orientation but not gender
identity.
A. Conflating Gender and Sexual Orientation to Preclude
Plaintiffs from Recovery
While a sex stereotype theory of liability permits plaintiffs to pur-
sue claims of sex discrimination, courts have been unwilling to apply
their own precedent in cases where gender stereotyping is intertwined
with sexual orientation.56 Recall that the Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse found a viable discrimination claim when Ann Hopkins’
employer refused to promote her based on her gender nonconform-
ity—her overly masculine mannerisms and dress.57 However, many
lower court judges have been concerned that homosexual plaintiffs
will “bootstrap” a claim of sexual orientation discrimination onto the
sex stereotyping theory in order to obtain relief in federal court.58
Therefore, despite the Price Waterhouse precedent, courts will conflate
56. See infra text accompanying notes 72–80.
57. Ann Hopkins’ nonconformity was not only one of appearance—the fact she did
not style her hair, wear jewelry, or dress femininely—but also one of behavior. Her co-
workers claimed that she was abrasive, “macho,” and “overcompensated for being a wo-
man.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). It is clear that the partners
evaluating Hopkins ascribed particular behaviors to males and females, most notably their
complaints over her use of profanity simply because “it’s a lady using foul language.” Id.
58. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation
of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV.
1, 23–24 (1995). Valdes’ analysis reveals that courts will use gender nonconformity as the
basis to preclude recovery for plaintiffs who are perceived to be of a particular sexual
orientation. He claims sexual orientation becomes the “loophole” for courts to avoid rul-
ing on cases involving gender-bias discrimination. A review of discrimination cases reveals
that defendants will concede sexual orientation bias and not gender bias, knowing that the
former is not protected under Title VII. See id. at 136–61. See also Ilona M. Turner, Sex
Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CAL. L. REV. 561, 572 (2007). Tur-
ner accounts for a similar trend with transgender cases. She believes courts experienced
confusion about the distinctions between gender nonconformity, sexual orientation, and
transgender status; transgender was also used interchangeably with homosexuality to deny
recovery also on the basis of sexual orientation.
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gender and sexual orientation to preclude recovery for these
individuals.59
This trend is troubling because gender nonconformist plaintiffs
currently have no alternative remedy of recovery under federal em-
ployment law. Legally recognizing sexual orientation under federal
employment law would obviate this concern and improve the efficacy
of anti-discrimination protections involving gender nonconforming
plaintiffs. Specifically, prohibiting employment discrimination on the
basis of “perceived sexual orientation” would permit gender noncon-
forming plaintiffs to pursue discrimination claims that are based on
sex stereotyping. To this end, judges would not be permitted to con-
flate sexual orientation and gender bias as a way to preclude recovery
for plaintiffs who deviate from societal expectations of masculinity
and femininity. A review of Title VII case law involving homosexual60
plaintiffs attempting to use the sex stereotyping theory of liability sug-
gests that these individuals are victims of discrimination not because
of their actual sexual orientation but because they exhibit noncon-
forming traits. This is the precise theory afforded to heterosexual, fe-
male plaintiffs who are gender nonconformists.
Courts have long been concerned about the discrimination over
a plaintiff’s gender nonconformity, particularly a plaintiff’s effeminate
appearance,61 but have ultimately rejected these claims on the basis of
59. See Valdes, supra note 58, at 135. According to Valdes, Western society conflates R
sexual orientation and gender such that “sexual gender typicality” is associated with heter-
osexuality while “atypicality” is associated with homosexuality. As a consequence, courts will
be persuaded by defendants who engage in a “conflationary framing” of a discrimination
case; courts will not consider a plaintiff’s effeminate appearance, but instead will defer to
sexual orientation as the premise of discriminatory behavior. Id. at 140–41. See also Case,
supra note 5, at 2–3. Case suggests that the law conflates sex and gender which has the R
consequence of differential treatment between masculine females and effeminate men.
She claims that a “man who exhibits feminine qualities is doubly despised, for manifesting
the disfavored qualities and for descending from his masculine gender privilege to do so.”
Id. at 3. Accordingly, courts continue to be skeptical of men who pursue gender bias dis-
crimination, despite the United States Supreme Court’s ruling that sex stereotyping is un-
lawful under Title VII. Id. at 3 n.3.
60. This is not to say that ENDA should be limited to individuals who are gay and
lesbian. The inclusion of perceived sexual orientation discrimination would permit recov-
ery for heterosexual employees who are misperceived to be homosexual based on gender
stereotypes. See, e.g., Humphries v. Consol. Grain & Barge Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 763 (S.D.
Ohio 2005) (rejecting the sex harassment and discrimination claims of a married, hetero-
sexual male who was physically beaten and called “Gay Ray,” “Cocksucker,” and “Slurpy
Boy,” on the grounds that there was no comparative evidence of differential treatment of
the sexes in the workplace).
61. See Case, supra note 5, at 2. The central thesis of Case’s scholarship on effeminate R
men suggests that individuals who deviate from typical traits assigned to their sex will be
perceived as homosexual. While females, most notably Ann Hopkins of the Price Waterhouse
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sexual orientation.62 For example, the court in Smith v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co.63 conflated the plaintiff’s gender with his sexual orienta-
tion to support its conclusion that Title VII was inapplicable. The
court reached this conclusion despite the defendant’s admission that
it relied on stereotyping when claiming that Smith’s effeminacy did
not make him well-suited for the position as a mail clerk.64 The trial
court debated whether to apply a plain meaning of sex in this case,
recognizing that this was not the typical case of sex discrimination;65
Smith was not hired on the basis of his gender nonconformity, not his
sex.66 Ultimately, the court adopted a strict interpretation of discrimi-
nation “because of sex” and concluded:
case, will receive protection for acting more masculine, the courts tend to deny discrimina-
tion protections to effeminate men.
62. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (denying
effeminate male plaintiff’s sexual harassment and discrimination claims of sex stereotyping
because recognition of such claims “would have the effect of de facto amending Title VII to
encompass sexual orientation”); Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 142 Fed. App’x 48, 51
(3d Cir. 2005) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because, although co-workers
made comments about plaintiff’s earring and sexuality, “the only reasonable reading of
this record compels the conclusion that the reprehensible conduct . . . was motivated by
sexual orientation bias rather than gender stereotyping”); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk
Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1063–65 (7th Cir. 2003) (denying relief for a heterosexual
plaintiff who was called a “faggot” and was told by co-workers he had a “high-pitched voice”
because such comments were targeted at his perceived sexual orientation); Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 257–61 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting plaintiff’s
claims of discrimination based on effeminate traits such as a high-pitched voice and femi-
nine mannerisms because he did not mention gender stereotyping or present any consid-
ered support); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 331–32 (9th Cir. 1979)
(concluding that effeminacy, like homosexuality, does not fall within the purview of Title
VII, thus rejecting plaintiff’s claim that he was terminated from his job as a nursery school
teacher because he wore an earring); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, No. 2:06-cv-259, 2007 WL
2702664, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2007) (concluding that an effeminate gay male’s reli-
ance on Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping is not justified because that case did not involve
sexual orientation); Klein v. McGowan, 36 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (D. Minn. 1999) (conclud-
ing that if gender and sex were equivalent under Title VII, the law would prohibit harass-
ment of an effeminate male or the perception of homosexuality, but Title VII does not
have such protection).
63. 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff’d, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1101.
66. Id. Although this case preceded Price Waterhouse, the Smith decision foreshadows
the courts’ conflation of sexual orientation and gender, particularly in cases involving ef-
feminacy and sexual stereotypes. See Joel W. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unful-
filled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 221–22
(2007). Furthermore, Valdes suggested that the Smith decision highlighted how courts will
render decisions that uphold cultural expectations of gender. In so doing, courts will “re-
cycle” traditional conceptions of sex and gender to maintain and perpetuate “hetero-patri-
archy.” Valdes, supra note 58, at 139. R
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The intent of the Civil Rights Act insofar as it applies to sex . . . is
“the guarantee of equal job opportunity for males and females.”
Whether or not the Congress should, by law, forbid discrimination
based upon “affectional or sexual preference” of an applicant, it is
clear that the Congress has not done so.67
Although Smith was decided before the adoption of sex stereotyping-
based discrimination, this decision foreshadowed a recurring problem
even after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse.
Courts do not apply Price Waterhouse in such cases because they
emphatically stress that sex stereotyping should not serve as an end-
around Title VII’s inapplicability to sexual orientation or sexual pref-
erence.68 Such concern is evident in the Second Circuit’s decision to
affirm summary judgment in favor of an employer faced with a female
employee’s claim of sexual stereotyping. In Dawson v. Bumble & Bum-
ble,69 the court rejected a lesbian hairstylist’s claim that her failure to
conform her appearance70 to feminine stereotypes resulted in her ter-
mination. The court recognized the applicability of Price Waterhouse in
this case, stating that an individual may have a claim under Title VII
where an employer acts out of animus toward an employee’s “exhibi-
tion of behavior considered to be stereotypically inappropriate for
their gender.”71 The court nevertheless declined to apply the appro-
priate precedent, expressing concern over the possibility that a homo-
67. Smith, 395 F. Supp. at 1101 (citation omitted).
68. One reason the courts view sexual orientation and gender stereotyping as mutu-
ally exclusive is to prevent litigants from using a Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory as
a way to “bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.” Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Simonton v. Runyon, 233 F.3d 33, 38
(2d Cir. 2000)); see also Kiley v. Am. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 296 Fed.
App’x 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2008); EEOC v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2569-TWT,
2008 WL 4098723, at *22 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2008); Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Sulli-
van, 497 F. Supp. 2d 29, 39 (D. Mass. 2007); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-
259, 2007 WL 2702664, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2007); Ianetta v. Putnam Inv., Inc., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 415, 422 (D. Mass. 2002); Martin v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 224 F. Supp.
2d 434, 446 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); Samborski v. W. Valley Nuclear Serv. Co., No. 99-CV-
0213E(F), 2002 WL 1477610, at *3 n.11 (W.D.N.Y. June, 25, 2002); Doe v. United Con-
sumer Fin. Serv., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001).
69. 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005).
70. Dawson described how co-workers referred to her as “Donald,” suggesting that she
appeared more masculine than what is expected of a female. Id. at 222. Another co-worker
commented that she wore her sexuality like a costume. Id. at 215. Both statements suggest
that it was her physical appearance that led her employer to discriminate against her gen-
der nonconformity and, necessarily, her sexual orientation. Id.
71. Id. at 218. The court goes on to state that, “[g]enerally speaking, one can fail to
conform to gender stereotypes in two ways: (1) through behavior or (2) through appear-
ance.” Id. at 221.
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sexual plaintiff will use sex stereotyping as a way to “bootstrap”72 a
claim for sexual orientation discrimination that is not within the scope
of Title VII.
This potential for bootstrapping has led courts to ostensibly have
a “threshold” which must be met before a case is considered as one of
gender stereotyping instead of sexual orientation discrimination.73 In
Trigg v. New York City Transit Authority,74 a male employee alleged that
he was demoted and harassed after his supervisor made derogatory
comments, calling him unmanly and a “faggot ass,” despite the fact
the employee had never disclosed his sexual orientation to anyone at
work.75 Similarly, in another case, a federal district court also rejected
a sex stereotyping theory of liability. The court viewed the plaintiff’s
accusations as based on sexual orientation and not on gender bias,
even though the plaintiff proffered evidence that his co-workers
mocked him by speaking with high-pitched voices and made feminine
gestures.76
The “threshold” implicitly applied by courts is a difficult standard
to satisfy. For example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court’s decision and found in favor of the defendants in the
case of Kay v. Independence Blue Cross.77 The court held that the dis-
criminatory conduct the plaintiff alleged was motivated by sexual ori-
entation rather than gender stereotyping. The plaintiff claimed he
was the victim of gender stereotyping when his coworkers left a flyer
for a gay sex phone line in his mailbox with the following typewritten
message: “A real man in the corporate world would not come to work
72. Id. at 218 (citing Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)). However,
other courts have been more lenient about sex stereotyping claims made by lesbians. See,
e.g., Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Or. 2002)
(concluding that the lesbian plaintiff stated a Title VII claim simply by alleging that be-
cause she dated other women, she did not conform to her supervisor’s notion of how a
woman should act).
73. See, e.g., Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 142 Fed. App’x 48, 51 (3d Cir. 2005)
(finding the use of gender-related jokes and abusive anti-gay comments fell short of the
“threshold” needed to succeed on a sex stereotyping theory under Title VII); Spearman v.
Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the plaintiff’s hostile work
environment claim and finding the hostile statements, taunting, and graffiti he endured
were based only on his perceived homosexuality, not his sex); Higgins v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe., Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 258 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate a hostile work environment claim despite the plaintiff’s claim of verbal
harassment and mocking due to his homosexuality).
74. No. 99-CV-4730, 2001 WL 868336 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2001), aff’d, 50 F. App’x 458
(2d Cir. 2002).
75. Id. at *17.
76. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261.
77. 142 Fed. App’x 48 (3d Cir. 2005).
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with an earring in his ear. But I guess you will never be a ‘real
man’!!!!!!”78 The court acknowledged that this comment could be in-
terpreted as gender stereotyping, and yet the court relied on Trigg to
conclude that the abusive language and gender-related jokes fell short
of the threshold needed for gender stereotyping.79
These rulings are examples of courts inappropriately conflating
gender and sexual orientation and are antithetical to the Price
Waterhouse precedent set by the Supreme Court nearly twenty years
ago.80 Based on the Smith and Dawson precedents, an employer could
easily defend an employment discrimination case by claiming that its
employment decision was motivated on permissible sexual stereotyp-
ing. However, ENDA’s passage with perceived sexual orientation lan-
guage would prohibit employers like Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company and Bumble & Bumble from hiring and firing employees
because of gender nonconforming physical attributes. Simply put,
under ENDA, an employer could not insulate himself from liability by
arguing that his employment decision was rooted in gender noncon-
formity and not sexual orientation.
Although previous case law has demonstrated courts’ willingness
to acknowledge that sexual orientation and gender conformity are
often intertwined, this is not to say that all courts hold this view. The
inextricable nature of gender and sexual orientation is clearly articu-
lated in Centola v. Potter.81 In that case the district court acknowledged
that sexual orientation harassment is instigated precisely because of
gender stereotyping, and explained:
Sexual orientation harassment is often, if not always, motivated by
a desire to enforce heterosexually defined norms. In fact, stereo-
types about homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes
about the proper roles of men and women. . . . [O]ne paradig-
matic form of stereotyping occurs when co-workers single out an
effeminate man for scorn . . . .82
The conflation of sex stereotyping and sexual orientation has led
to the muddling of case law in which no clear legal standard exists.
Instead, litigants continue to engage in an exercise of artful plead-
ing.83 Importantly, many of the cases do not reveal the plaintiff’s ac-
78. Id. at 50.
79. Id. at 51.
80. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
81. 183 F. Supp. 2d. 403 (D. Mass. 2002).
82. Id. at 410.
83. See JOEL W. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 424 (6th ed. 2007).
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tual sexual orientation, but rather merely a perception of the
plaintiff’s sexual orientation based on their gender conformity. For
example, in Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc.,84 the court re-
jected the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination on the basis of sex stere-
otyping. Despite the plaintiff’s assertion of sex stereotyping, his
pleadings suggested that he was a victim of sexual orientation discrim-
ination.85 This linguistic slippage on the part of the plaintiff suggests
the common inescapable relationship between gender and homosex-
uality. Thus, disaggregating these concepts in discrimination law leads
to litigation, where a predominant factor in the success of a plaintiff’s
claim is dependent on using the correct wording. ENDA could rem-
edy this inequity. If courts are forced to consider perceived sexual ori-
entation, and thereby forced to engage in a sex stereotyping analysis,
then they will be prevented from encountering the potential pitfall of
inconsistently conflating and disaggregating gender identity and sex-
ual orientation to prevent a homosexual plaintiff from legal recovery.
B. The Extreme Case of Gender Nonconformity: Transgender
Rights Under a Stereotyping Theory of Liability
A gender identity inclusive ENDA would permit transgender
plaintiffs to pursue a federal employment discrimination claim that is
currently not expressly available to them. Courts have traditionally ex-
cluded transgenders from the protection of sex discrimination law in
favor of a strict, biological interpretation of the term “sex.”86 In the
seminal case on transgender employment discrimination, Ulane v.
84. 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003).
85. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 83, at 424–25. R
86. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 98 Fed. App’x 461, 461 (6th Cir. 2004);
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg.,
Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659,
662 (9th Cir. 1977); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisana, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL
31098541, at *6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002); Rentos v. Oce-Office Systems, No. 95 CIV. 7908,
1996 WL 737215, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996); James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., No.
94-2235-KHV, 1994 WL 731517, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 1994); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt.
Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F.
Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Emanuelle v. U.S. Tobacco Co., No. 85 C 8165, 1987 WL
19165, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 1987); Doe v. U.S. Postal Service, Civ. A. No. 84-3296, 1985
WL 9446, at *2 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985); Powell v. Read’s, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D.
Md. 1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
aff’d, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978); Grossman v. Bernards Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904,
1975 WL 302 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975), aff’d, 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976).
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Eastern Airlines, Inc.,87 the court deferred to the biological definition
of “sex,” and held it should be interpreted narrowly because “[t]he
phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on sex, in its
plain meaning, implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against wo-
men because they are women and against men because they are
men.”88 As a result of this holding in Ulane, most courts have since
employed a plain meaning definition of sex and the statute’s legisla-
tive history to reach the same conclusion.
A consequence of the Ulane decision is that courts are unwilling
to include transgenders in their view of sex and sex stereotype dis-
crimination. One scholar, Richard Green, explicates the complexity of
defining an individual’s sexual identity by stating it can be determined
by multiple criteria including the sex chromosomes, the gonads, hor-
monal levels, genital appearance, and internal reproductive struc-
tures.89 Considering this, Green claims transgender plaintiffs
encounter a legal “Catch-22” in which they cannot allege gender dis-
crimination because courts will conclude that they are being discrimi-
nated against because of their gender identity, nor can they allege
transgender discrimination because such protections are not statuto-
rily available under Title VII.90 Moreover, “[s]ince transsexualism is a
statement about gender, the requirement that the transsexual em-
ployee alternatively prove discrimination based on status as a woman
87. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). The case involved Kenneth Ulane, an airline pilot
who worked for the airline for twenty-two years but was fired shortly after undergoing gen-
der reassignment surgery in 1980. Id at 1082–83.
88. Id. at 1085. But see Kristine W. Holt, Reevaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protec-
tion, and the Evolution of a Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 296–97 (1997).
Holt’s research demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit has inconsistently applied “sex.”
Holt discussed the court’s holding in Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.
1971), which involved a company policy in which female flight attendants could not be
married; there was no such policy for men. Id. at 1198. The court in Sprogis expanded “sex”
to include sexual stereotypes. The court noted that sex “is not confined to explicit discrimi-
nations based ‘solely’ on sex. . . . Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” Id. However, thir-
teen years later, in Ulane, the same circuit refused to extend the scope of Title VII. In
reaching its determination, the court made scathing remarks about Title VII protections
for transgender plaintiffs:
Congress has a right to deliberate on whether it wants such a broad sweeping of
the untraditional and unusual within the term “sex” as used in Title VII. . . . If
Congress believes that transsexuals should enjoy the protection of Title VII, it
may so provide. Until that time, however, we decline in behalf of the Congress to
judicially expand the definition of sex as used in Title VII.
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 (emphasis added).
89. Richard Green, Spelling “Relief” for Transsexuals: Employment Discrimination and the
Criteria of Sex, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 126 (1985).
90. Id. at 134.
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or man and as a transsexual both creates and enforces an artificial
distinction.”91
In earlier cases involving transgender individuals, the courts ex-
hibited this “Catch-22” standard in several dispositive motions. James v.
Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc. (“Ranch Mart”)92 was the first93 of two Title
VII transgender cases decided after Price Waterhouse. In Ranch Mart,
Barbara Renee James claimed that she was fired after and because she
notified her employer that she intended to begin living and working
full-time as a man. The court ignored Price Waterhouse and instead
cited precedent that adopted a plain-meaning interpretation of sex
discrimination, which, as a consequence, reiterated that employment
discrimination based upon transsexualism is not prohibited by Title
VII.94 The court stated, “[e]ven if plaintiff is psychologically female,
Congress did not intend ‘to ignore anatomical classification and de-
termine a person’s sex according to the psychological makeup of that
individual.’”95 This reference to anatomy as a way of defining Title
VII’s “sex” ignores Price Waterhouse’s recognition that sex discrimina-
tion is as much about the behaviors, actions, and outward appearance
of a plaintiff as his or her genitals.
Likewise, in Broadus v. State Farm Insurance Co.,96 the court ques-
tioned the applicability of the Price Waterhouse precedent and found
transgender discrimination different than impermissible sex stere-
otyping. In Broadus, a transitioning female-to-male transsexual
claimed that his supervisor harassed him because of his masculine ap-
pearance.97 The facts presented in this case are strikingly similar to
the facts in Price Waterhouse. In evaluating the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, the court recognized that Price Waterhouse found
91. Id. at 130.
92. No. 94-2235-KHV, 1994 WL 731517 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 1994).
93. While Ranch Mart may be one of the earliest post Price Waterhouse cases to involve
transgender employment discrimination, there was an earlier case in which the courts
adopted a broader definition of “sex.” Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
In that case, a transgender prisoner alleged that she was sexually assaulted by a guard in an
all-male prison. She sued the guard and other prison officials under the Gender Motivated
Violence Act, a statute that parallels Title VII. Id. at 1202. The court ruled in favor of the
plaintiff, noting that although federal courts had initially distinguished sex from gender,
that “the logic and language” of the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse had over-
ruled this approach, and, consequently, the court held that Title VII encompasses both sex
and gender. Id. at 1201.
94. Ranch Mart, 1994 WL 731517, at *1.
95. Id. at *3 (quoting Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir.
1982)).
96. No. 98-4254CVCSOWECF, 2000 WL 1585257 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 11, 2000).
97. Id. at *1.
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that sexual stereotyping that plays a role in an employment decision is
actionable under Title VII. The court distinguished Price Waterhouse by
noting that the plaintiff in that case, Ann Hopkins, was not a transsex-
ual and that the current plaintiff was. The court noted, “[i]t is unclear
. . . whether a transsexual is protected from sex discrimination and
sexual harassment under Title VII.”98 The plaintiff ultimately lost on
different grounds—he failed to establish the elements needed for a
hostile work environment claim. However, this case demonstrates
courts’ uncertainty in extending Price Waterhouse to cases involving
transgender individuals.99
Ranch Mart and Broadus presented opportunities for courts to util-
ize the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse to evaluate a Title
VII claim by a transgender plaintiff. Both decisions, however, failed to
do so. Thus, most Title VII transgender cases are grounded in a bio-
logical definition of “sex” that is much narrower than the Supreme
Court’s definition in Price Waterhouse.100
Courts have typically precluded recovery for transgender plain-
tiffs, but three cases have extended the sex stereotyping theory in
transgender discrimination cases, suggesting that some judges recog-
nize the link between sex stereotyping and transgender identity. The
Sixth Circuit, for example, was the first circuit to hold that Title VII
protected transgender employees. The plaintiff in Smith v. City of Sa-
lem101 was a fire department lieutenant who had been diagnosed with
gender identity disorder.102 After informing his supervisor of the diag-
nosis, city officials tried to force him to resign by requiring him to
undergo psychological evaluations and suspending him. The Sixth
Circuit noted that courts had previously rejected Title VII claims in
cases such as Ulane because the plaintiffs were victims of “gender” and
not “sex” discrimination, and only the latter is actionable.103 The
court found that the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse
98. Id. at *4.
99. Id. As was already noted, the Court determined in Price Waterhouse that Ann Hop-
kins experienced sex discrimination based on her behaviors and actions—characteristics
that constitute one’s psychological composition. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 256 (1989).
100. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (“Congress intended to strike at the entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” (quoting
L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 43 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978))).
101. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
102. Id. at 568. According to the American Psychiatric Association, gender identity dis-
order is defined as “a disjunction between an individual’s sexual organs and sexual iden-
tity.” See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 10, at 655. R
103. Smith, 378 F.3d at 572–73.
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“eviscerated” that distinction.104 Thus, the Sixth Circuit determined
that discrimination against a transgender person who fails to act in
accordance with his or her anatomical sex was no different from the
discrimination Ann Hopkins faced at Price Waterhouse.105 Writing for
the three-judge panel, Judge Cole stated that “[s]ex stereotyping
based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissi-
ble discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior.”106
The recent decision in Schroer v. Billington,107 although a victory,
illustrates ongoing reluctance in the application of sex stereotyping
claims involving transgender individuals. Diane Schroer, a male-to-fe-
male transgender formerly known as David, interviewed and was of-
fered a job working for the Congressional Research Service at Library
of Congress. When the supervisory employee learned about her up-
coming sex reassignment surgery, the plaintiff’s job offer was revoked.
The person who hired the plaintiff withdrew the offer, argued that the
plaintiff was untrustworthy and would be unable to focus on the
job.108 The District Court for the District of Columbia viewed these
reasons as pretextual sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, but
was unclear whether this adverse employment action was based on sex
sterotyping, sex discrimination of both.109 This decision was an inter-
esting departure from Ulane precedent, and the court believed that
this case was sex discrimination per se because:
The evidence establishes that the Library was enthusiastic about
hiring David Schroer—until she disclosed her transsexuality. The
Library revoked the offer when it learned that a man named David
intended to become, [sic] legally, culturally, and physically, a wo-
man name Diane. This was discrimination “because of . . . sex.”110
104. Id. at 573.
105. Id. at 575. As the court noted, “[i]t follows that employers who discriminate
against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are
also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur but for
the victim’s sex.” Id. at 574.
106. Id. at 575. Similarly, in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir.
2005), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, a male-to-female
transsexual police sergeant, because gender nonconformity is sex stereotyping and there-
fore unlawful. Barnes was demoted because, although he presented as a male on-duty and
as a female off-duty, he occasionally came to work wearing makeup or lipstick. Id. at 734.
Because of this, Barnes’ supervisors told him he was not masculine enough and lacked
“command presence,” a term that was loosely interpreted to suggest that his appearance
and demeanor did not conform to the job requirements sufficient for promotion. Id.
107. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295–99 (D.D.C. 2008).
108. Id. at 298.
109. Id. at 300–06.
110. Id. at 306.
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This case marks another victory in the fight for federal employment
protections for transgenders, but it is questionable whether other
lower courts will apply this precedent or simply employ a literal mean-
ing as evidenced by a majority of transgender cases.111
Some scholars believe the Smith and Schroer decisions demon-
strate a movement away from the biological concepts of sex and more
toward a socially constructed understanding of gender.112 The inter-
esting and potential trend in future case law development is proffer-
ing medical documentation to prove one’s transgender status. The
plaintiff in Smith was medically diagnosed with gender identity
dysphoria.113 Schroer was also diagnosed with gender identity
dysphoria and planned to undergo sex reassignment surgery.114 More-
over, Barnes was a pre-operative transsexual.115 This is consistent with
the fact that an overwhelming number of courts reject the sex discrim-
ination claims of transgender individuals,116 despite the fact these are
cases of gender nonconformity.
111. The court in this case expressed concern that all transgender plaintiffs do not
have actionable claims simply because they mention sex stereotyping. Id. at 304 (citing
Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208 (D.D.C. 2006)). In other words, the district
court indicated that Title VII should not preclude transgenders from recovery, but did
note that they still must prove that discrimination occurred because of their gender non-
conforming physical appearance. Id. (citing Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 211).
112. See, e.g., Anna Kirkland, What’s at Stake in Transgender Discrimination as Sex Discrimi-
nation?, 32 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 83, 88 (2006).
113. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004).
114. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295.
115. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2005).
116. Although this Article uses the term transgender more broadly to encompass both
transgenderism and transsexualism, most cases in which courts have extended Title VII sex
stereotyping discrimination involved plaintiffs who were transsexual, and who each ob-
tained a formal medical diagnosis of gender identity disorder. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 568;
Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295. But see Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224–25
(10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting male-to-female transsexual’s sex stereotyping claim by finding
the transit authority offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for prohibiting the
plaintiff from using the women’s restrooms); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d
996, 1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (rejecting a male-to-female pre-operative transsexual’s claim
because forcing her to use the men’s restroom did not constitute sex stereotyping).
A potential reason for this expansion of sex stereotyping discrimination liability by
courts could be that transsexuals are individuals with sexual identity disorders, defined by a
strong and persistent belief of having been born into the wrong body and a desire to live or
be treated as the other sex. They seek psychotherapy, hormone treatments, change of legal
status, and often sex reassignment surgery. A. Evan Eyler, Primary Care of the Gender-Variant
Patient, in PRINCIPLES OF TRANSGENDER MEDICINE AND SURGERY 15–33 (Randi Ettner, Stan
Monstrey & A. Evan Eyler eds., 2007). These supplementary steps may be the additional
evidentiary proof judges were seeking to justify a sex stereotype discrimination theory of
liability.
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III. Implications of ENDA and Reexamination of the Role of
Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
A review of literature and case law shows that courts have a ten-
dency to conflate sexual orientation and sex stereotyping for purposes
of denying recovery under Title VII. Currently, gender nonconform-
ing plaintiffs have been unsuccessful at obtaining relief even for sex
stereotyping claims that facially resemble the facts in Price Waterhouse.
However, the current iteration of ENDA would help cure this problem
by forcing courts to consider gender nonconformity as a basis for
proving a claim of perceived sexual orientation. Given the often inex-
tricable relationship between gender identity (or “looking homosex-
ual”) and sexual orientation, this law would prevent the
disaggregation of these categories. More importantly, a fully inclusive
ENDA would result in a consistent application of sex stereotyping lia-
bility in all discrimination cases.
A. Sexual Stereotyping as a Legitimate Non-Discriminatory
Reason?117
A gender identity inclusive-ENDA would resolve a history of inef-
fective application of sex stereotyping liability in transgender cases.
This protection is necessary especially in light of the trend in which
courts refuse to apply a sex stereotyping theory of liability and instead
favor a biological interpretation of sex when considering sex discrimi-
nation cases involving transgender individuals. However, given the re-
sistance to pass a fully inclusive ENDA, this Part highlights the
consequences if transgender employees continue to remain unpro-
tected under federal discrimination law.
By opposing a gender identity inclusive-ENDA, or at least the pos-
sibility of recovery for sex stereotyping, employers can and have used
117. Although this Article focuses on the consequences of not recognizing and
including gender identity in ENDA, it is important to highlight the Title VII disparate
treatment framework. According to Supreme Court precedent, in order to prevail on a
Title VII action, the plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case by showing the
following: (1) he is a member of a protected class as defined under Title VII; (2) he is
qualified or able to perform his job; (3) there was an adverse employment action; and (4)
circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
burden of production and persuasion shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision at issue. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). If the employer satisfies this requirement,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer’s “proffered reasons [were] pretextual.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 530 (1993).
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gender nonconformity as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason to
terminate an employee. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Holloway v.
Arthur Anderson & Co.118 agreed that the employer could fire Ramona
Holloway, not because she was transsexual, but because her “dress,
appearance and manner . . . were such that it was very disruptive and
embarrassing to all concerned.”119 The Holloway decision reveals that,
under Title VII, an employer can legitimately fire an employer by al-
leging simply that the employee’s gender nonconformity hinders pro-
ductivity in the workplace.
The removal of gender protections from ENDA would also mean
that employers could continue to use a dress code policy to legiti-
mately terminate transgender individuals.120 One notable case of such
118. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
119. See, e.g., id. at 661 n.1; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 748–49 (8th
Cir. 1982) (noting the discovery that an employee was a male-to-female pre-operative
transsexual led to an alleged disruption of the company’s work routine, since a number of
female employees indicated they would quit if Sommers used the women’s restroom);
Grossman v. Bernards Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975)
(holding a male-to-female employee legitimately lost her job because of her change in
gender); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp 456, 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(finding employer legally fired a hemodialysis technician because the employee’s desire to
undergo a sex change “might have a potentially adverse effect on both the patients receiv-
ing treatment . . . and on plaintiff’s coworkers caring for those patients”).
120. This concern would be obviated with having dress code policies for transgender
employees who transition on the job. House Bill 3017 includes this provision and provides,
inter alia:
DRESS AND GROOMING STANDARDS.—Nothing in this Act shall prohibit an em-
ployer from requiring an employee, during the employee’s hours at work, to ad-
here to reasonable dress or grooming standards not prohibited by other
provisions of Federal, State, or local law, provided that the employer permits any
employee who has undergone gender transition prior to the time of employment,
and any employee who has notified the employer that the employee has under-
gone or is undergoing gender transition after the time of employment, to adhere
to the same dress or grooming standards for the gender to which the employee
has transitioned or is transitioning.
H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. § 8(a)(5) (2009). This is significant because sex-specific dress
codes enforced by employers and schools have been upheld by courts. See, e.g., Jespersen v.
Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that terminating
an employee for failure to adhere to employer’s sex-specific dress code did not amount to
sex discrimination); Olesen v. Bd. of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 820, 822–23 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(upholding school’s dress code policy that prohibited male students from wearing ear-
rings). Such sex-specific dress codes are often proffered reasons by defendants to discrimi-
nate against transgender employees. See, e.g., Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-CV-
465RM, 2007 WL 2265630, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2007) (male-to-female pre-operative
transsexual told by the company to dress as a male or face termination); James v. Ranch
Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D. Kan. 1995) (male-to-female transgender
told by employer that the employer preferred that she come to work as a man and not wear
her wig, dress, and makeup).
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a termination involved Andria Adams Dobre, a male-to-female Amtrak
employee who filed a lawsuit under Title VII and the Pennsylvania
Human Rights Act.121 Dobre claimed that Amtrak had discriminated
against her once she began receiving hormone injections.122 Her em-
ployer indicated that she had to dress as a male unless she provided a
doctor’s note. Even after Dobre provided a doctor’s note, she still was
not permitted to use the women’s restroom. In other words, Dobre
was permitted to present as a female but was still forced to use the
men’s restroom. The court concluded that Dobre could not success-
fully make a claim of discrimination because “the acts of discrimina-
tion alleged by the plaintiff were not due to stereotypic concepts
about a woman’s ability to perform a job nor were they due to a condi-
tion common to women alone.”123
B. Reexamination of Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
Sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination are never
really about sex or sexual preference, but rather gender nonconform-
ity. However, the most recent ENDA somewhat recognizes the similar-
ity between discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and on
the basis of gender identity. Consequently, a gender identity inclusive-
ENDA would only create a consistent application of gender noncon-
formity discrimination.
More importantly, the passage of a fully inclusive ENDA would
demonstrate a more contemporary understanding of the interplay be-
tween sex, gender, and sexual orientation. Scholars point out the un-
Although the issue of dressing room facilities may be somewhat resolved by ENDA,
there is no provision concerning restroom facilities and the accommodations that should
be made for transgender employees. In fact, House Bill 3017 expressly states that employ-
ers will not be required to build new facilities to accommodate transgender people. H.R.
3017, 111th Cong. § 8(a)(4) (2009). This provision may prove to be problematic because
several controversies have involved transgender bathroom usage. See, e.g., Kastl v. Maricopa
County Cmty. College Dist., No 06-16907, 2009 WL 990760, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2009)
(affirming the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims because she did not provide sufficient evidence
to rebut claims to ban her from the women’s restroom); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502
F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (upholding the firing of transwoman in part because
employees expressed concern over her bathroom usage); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 98
Fed. App’x 461, 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding the prohibition of a transwoman from
using the women’s restroom and returning to work until she returned with a note from her
doctor).
121. Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
122. Id. at 286.
123. Id. at 287. This case illustrates that even though the court recognizes gender non-
conformity, it is unwilling to apply a sex stereotype theory of liability in this case.
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due reliance on biology in sex discrimination cases,124 but
disagreement has emerged as to how to draw the boundaries between
sex, gender, and sexual orientation in discrimination cases.125 Admit-
tedly such a task is a difficult one. On one hand, a bright-line set of
definitions would aid courts in applying past precedent. On the other
hand, the use of rigid definitions undermines the fluid nature of
gender.126
Scholars agree that gender should be the focal point in sex dis-
crimination claims. This agreement suggests two things. First, gender
should always remain a point of inquiry in any discrimination laws per-
taining to sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity. As demon-
strated, the inescapable, pervasive nature of gender is such that
eliminating it from inquiry would preclude viable recovery for many
plaintiffs. To this end, conflating gender with another attribute such
as sexual orientation or sex dispels some of the confusion courts face
in determining what is actionable under the law. Second, considering
gender also shows a more accurate description of the discriminatory
animus that occurs in the workplace. In the case of sexual orientation,
a person is not the victim of discrimination because co-workers know
the person’s sexual preference, rather it is because they exhibit differ-
ing, non-conforming traits and mannerisms. These deviations lead
124. See Franke, supra note 5, at 2. R
125. See, e.g., Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender
Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 395
(2001). Flynn asserts that gender should be a focal point of inquiry because sex and sexual
orientation jurisprudence are unduly premised upon the traditional understanding of
“sex” as determined by anatomy at birth. See also Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 196 (1988) (suggesting that gender must be
included in cases of sexual orientation discrimination because such discrimination is not
based on the “condemnation of sexual behavior,” but rather violating “prescriptions of
gender role expectations”). But see KINGSLEY R. BROWNE, BIOLOGY AT WORK: RETHINKING
SEXUAL INEQUALITY 44–45 (2002) (advocating that biological differences between men and
women should be considered to provide a more illustrative picture of workplace inequal-
ity); Richard A. Epstein, Gender is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 990 (1992) (arguing
that the term “sex” rather than “gender” should be used in discrimination jurisprudence in
part because there are biological bases of behavior that cannot be attributed to gender).
126. See, e.g., Kate Bornstein, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US
52 (1994) (arguing that gender can and should be viewed as more fluid); Andrew Gilden,
Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY
J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 86–87 (2008) (proposing that acknowledging gender fluidity
would recognize the diversity in gender identities, particularly transgender identity); Dylan
Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of
Gender That Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 311 (2005)
(suggesting that relying on the “sex-gender” distinction only reaffirms the undue reliance
on biology, making it difficult for gender nonconforming litigants in court).
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people to assume that gender nonconformity is a mark of
homosexuality.
In the case of transgender protections, adding gender identity
within the purview of ENDA is the best strategy to prevent the incon-
sistent application of sex and gender in discrimination cases. An ex-
plicit prohibition of “gender identity” discrimination serves a dual
purpose. First, the addition of gender identity gives legitimacy to
claims that otherwise have and would have been inapplicable under
federal law (e.g., Title VII not being applicable in transgender cases).
Second, it provides a more contemporary understanding of the rela-
tionship between sex, gender, and sexual orientation; it is rare that
discrimination is motivated by sex or sexual orientation, rather it is
triggered in response to individuals who challenge the gender binary
and societal construction of what it means to be a male or female.
Conclusion
The passage of a fully inclusive ENDA would serve as a victory for
gay, lesbian, and transgender employees. However, and more impor-
tantly, ENDA would provide a better understanding of employment
discrimination of gay, lesbian, and transgender plaintiffs. Such plain-
tiffs tend to be targets of discrimination in the workplace because they
are gender nonconformists whose appearance and mannerisms devi-
ate from traditional notions of masculinity and femininity. However,
previous attempts for a gender identity inclusive ENDA should give
pause as to whether law makers will actually retain this protection.
Passing this law without gender identity protections would only create
a disparate application of gender nonconformity discrimination and
necessarily preclude transgenders from pursuing their claims at the
federal level.
Some courts have extended Title VII sex stereotype discrimina-
tion protections to transgender employees, but more courts defer to
biology and preclude recovery. Obviously, a gender identity inclusive
ENDA would permit transgender employees—a more extreme case of
gender nonconformity—a guaranteed outlet for legal redress. This is
critical because, at this point, the only claims in which these individu-
als have been successful under Title VII have been those where the
plaintiff had a medical diagnosis of gender identity dysphoria. Moreo-
ver, the current Title VII framework allows employers to provide a
legitimate non-discriminatory purpose to defeat the plaintiff’s prima
facie case, and they can simply argue gender nonconformity (e.g.,
dress code, bathroom usage) is the precise reason for the adverse em-
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ployment action. In other words, a gender identity exclusive ENDA
would prohibit employers from discriminating against a homosexual
employee on the basis of gender nonconformity, but employers could
continue to discriminate against transgender individuals.
As the discussion of gender theory demonstrates, inconsistently
applying gender bias in legal analyses leads to inconsistent outcomes
that deny recovery for individuals who need protections in the work-
place. In the case of ENDA, a law rooted in sexual orientation, actual
and perceived, but not gender identity, does not fully recognize the
fluidity of sex, gender (including transgender), and sexual orienta-
tion. The passage of ENDA, although successful in some respects,
could legitimize the traditional bipolar, biological notion of men and
women in others.
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